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ABSTRACT
Small-family norms in industrial societies, and large-family norms in developing
societies, present quite different motivational problems respecting population control.
In the former, means are now more important than motives, while in the latter just the
opposite is true. Yet programs of family planning in developing nations continue to operate
with the assumption that means are more important than motives. Results of cross-
cultural research on the social and psychological factors affecting fertility may serve better
than clinic-based efforts, in the long run, to reverse the present rapid population growth in
developing societies.
INTRODUCTION
Man has always practiced some form of population control, as witnessed by
the ubiquitous gap between human fecundity, the biological capacity to reproduce,
and fertility, the reproduction actually achieved. Infanticide, abortion, contra-
ception, family structure, and marriage taboos represent forms of population
control, whether intended or not, among human beings at various levels of social
organization—family, clan, community, and society. Certainly the idea of
population control is no longer novel among the people of many nations. The
history of industrial societies is replete with changing norms relevant to family
planning. Especially noteworthy has been the transition from social norms with
population control as an indirect consequence to social norms directly intended to
foster limited reproduction. This transition has resulted in two types of popula-
tion control problems.
Though intimately related, there is a considerable and important difference
between elements of the social structure affecting fertility indirectly, such as
employment opportunities and proportion of females in the labor force, and motiva-
tional factors among specific couples which directly underly the basic inducements
toward families of a certain size. For example, patterns of urbanization and
industrialization slowly, but certainly, effect changes in social organization, which
subsequently permit changed cultural definitions of desirable family size. That is,
cultural values are overhauled, there is a revolution in thinking about families
and children, and average family size usually declines. This is the well-known
historical pattern of most Western industrial societies, commonly summarized as
the "Demographic Transition." The end result of low to moderate fertility, as
compared with underdeveloped nations, presents a type of problem for population
control which is relatively unique. That is, among industrial populations the
problem is largely one of finding more effective means of control rather than of
persuading individuals to accept family planning in principle.
By contrast, in underdeveloped countries where the vast majority of the
world's population resides and where the potential for population growth is greatest,
the problem is quite different. As Notestein (1945: 39) commented some years
ago, with reference to high fertility societies:
All such societies are . . . ingeniously arranged to obtain the required births. Their
religious doctrines, moral codes, laws, education, community customs, marriage
habits, and family organization are all focused toward maintaining high fertility.
We can be certain that these high-fertility countries will not follow the Western
sequence of changed social organization first, followed by gradual fertility decline.
There is not enough time for that. Many of the developing nations are increasing
their populations at rates that cannot possibly continue for very long without a
consequent increase in mortality. For these nations, changed family valuations
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affecting lower fertility cannot await changes in social organization, as they did
in the West. Instead, for many nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the
changed valuations of children must come first. The motivations for family
planning must be strong enough to induce a use of whatever means are available
to effect that planning. Otherwise, the social organization itself cannot signifi-
cantly change, for real economic gains will be thwarted by the burden of over-
population.
In the underdeveloped nations, a relationship between small family size and
economic welfare is not obvious to most people. In addition, the means for
limiting family size often are not sociologically, economically, or psychologically
accessible. In industrial societies, just the opposite is the case; the link between
family size and personal welfare is obvious to most people, and the means are
usually available. What we are suggesting is that the motivational problems
involved in reducing fertility in these two types of societies, developing and
industrial, may be quite dissimilar, and thereby require different kinds of study
and planning.
We believe that means are now more important than motives in industrial
societies, while motives are more important than means in the developing nations.
While it seems true that when the motives are strong enough the means will be
found, as the Japanese experience indicates (Koya, 1957), it seems useful to make a
distinction, by type of society, regarding the relative importance of motives versus
means.
The logic of this approach to population control assumes a sociologistic, in
contrast to a biologistic model. That is, social and cultural variables affecting
fertility, rather than biological variables affecting fecundity, constitute the major
focus. Because of continued interest in biologistic models, however, and for
purposes of contrast, they will be briefly explored.
BIOLOGISTIC MODELS
The first modern scholars to attempt explanations of population change
seemingly were influenced more by the biological than by the sociological dimensions
in the work of Thomas Malthus (1872). Malthus' emphasis on sexual passions
and man's need for food, as well as his laws of population and food increase, have
sometimes been taken by other writers as the sum of his theory. Michael Thomas
Sadler (1829), for example, believed that nature provided its own balance of
population, as fecundity diminished with an increase in population density.
Thomas Doubleday (1874) argued that, as the quality of food improves, fecundity
decreases. Thus those who consumed meat would be less fecund than those who
lived on grains and vegetables. In an effort to fit population growth into his
general theory of an analogy between human society and the organic world,
Herbert Spencer (1867) argued that fecundity decreases as the complexity of
human life increases. In another theory by analogy, Raymond Pearl and Lowell
Reed (1920), after studying the reproductive behavior of fruit flies, fitted human
population growth to logistic curves.
Because these biological models focused on fecundity rather than fertility,
as well as on birth rates instead of differences between birth and death rates, their
usefulness for human populations was extremely limited. Yet biological models
of human population change persist, at least by implication. Hudson Hoagland
(1964:814), for example, recently implied an extrapolation from animal to human
mechanisms of population control when he wrote that we "may learn something
relevant to our problem [of population control] from a consideration of how animals
regulate and control their population problems." The literature on the reproduc-
tive behavior of fruit flies, flour beetles, hares, and rats, among others, is usually
cited to make this point. Special reference is being made today to the "stress
syndrome" outlined by Hans Selye (1950), in which overcrowding leads, in turn,
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to biologically induced pathological behavior and sharply reduced population
growth. From such studies, Hoagland admits to the temptation of drawing
comparisons between overcrowded animal populations and city slums. Nonethe-
less, it is interesting to note that Hoagland ends his discussion of human popula-
tion control by reference to such cultural factors as changes in social, economic,
and educational conditions, and the motivations underlying individual attempts
at economic improvement.
A SOCIOLOGISTIC MODEL
The link between a human couple and a given level of fertility is, of course,
highly complex. The variables operating in this linkage include, at a minimum,
factors affecting exposure to intercourse, exposure to conception, and gestation
and successful parturition (Davis and Blake, 1956). Obviously these variables
include both biological and sociological elements. The transformation from
high to low fertility among Western peoples, however, provides a partial answer
to the culture-z>ersMS-biology question.
Let us, with Ryder (1957), ask why the birth rates have declined in virtually
every country experiencing modernization. All reductions in fertility must
operate through changed probabilities of intercourse, conception and, once con-
ception occurs, of birth. No society has ever been indifferent to fertility, for
fertility norms are found in all societies. And every society induces, through
socialization, conformity with these norms. In a sense the demographic transition
is, then, a substitution of individual goals for familial and societal goals.
Peasant societies, for example, are characterized by early marriage, a social
factor affecting the probability of intercourse. Usually the newly married couple
is incorporated into a larger economic unit based on kinship. And because the
economic context is one in which additional labor is useful, the couple typically
experiences high fertility.
The extended family eventually gave way, in Europe, to the nuclear family,
where children were more directly the responsibility of each couple. This meant
that marriage was usually delayed until certain prerequisites for the responsibility
of children could be met. Two additional factors accompanied this change in
family organization: a decline in mortality and an increase in income expectations.
The declining mortality put increased pressure on the child-parent relationship,
but most importantly, there was a concomitant economic development. Economic
opportunities provided by urban industry and new world resources made large
families a much less rewarding experience.
There followed rapidly the institutionalization of various individual rights,
including the prohibition of child labor, compulsory education, and the new
statuses for women. Thus the modern family, through the loss of selected func-
tions, is no longer essential to education, employment, or social security. In
short, in industrial societies, the relationship between small family size and indi-
vidual economic and personal advantage is now obvious to most people. Present
costs of rearing and educating children make large families economically burden-
some. In addition, relatively affluent societies offer much by way of personally
rewarding alternatives to large families. The saliency of personal freedom to do
as one likes, to spend one's money in the pursuit of material and psychological
goals, must be considerable. And unborn children must therefore compete with
a wide assortment of motivationally relevant alternatives.
The remaining gaps between desired family size and actual family size in most
industrial societies are probably due more to the lack of convenient and effective
means than to a significant lack of motivation. For example, it is estimated that
about 20 percent of all first pregnancies in the United States are premarital
(Lowrie, 1965). In addition, perhaps as many as one million American preg-
nancies are terminated by induced abortions each year (Calderone, 1958). In
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both cases it is reasonable to assume that most of the pregnancies were unwanted.
So, even with relatively easy access to contraceptives, and even with small-family
norms, there is a substantial amount of unwanted pregnancy in the United States.
Here then is a kind of society in which we would expect improved means of fertility
control to be especially rewarding.
For Western peoples, the motivational problem of the future must probably
assume the dimensions of collective responsibility, a return to broader social
interests. There will probably come a time when significant differences in per-
spective between individual decisions affecting fertility levels, and the social
aggregate exposed to the consequences of these levels, will require government
intervention of some kind. But because of the motivational nature of population
problems in the underdeveloped nations, large-scale government intervention is
much more likely to occur in those areas within the next few years.
THE DEVELOPING NATIONS
In the developing nations, where poverty is most ubiquitous, the relationship
between fertility and economic advantage is not usually obvious to the vast
majority of the population, and for good reasons. The economic benefits of
reduced fertility accrue slowly, on a society-wide scale, and are not translated into
real and significant economic gains for individual couples for perhaps several
generations. With declining fertility, a society can more readily accumulate
capital with which to industrialize, and the dependency ratio and labor force
composition become more favorable to development generally (Coale, 1963).
But it is a cruel fact that, while the industrial process will eventually benefit
future generations, it will not very much help the masses of people now living.
The governments of underdeveloped nations must establish priorities, and the
first of these are not likely to be of direct advantage to successful family-planners.
To many people in the developing nations, in other words, it will not seem to
make much personal difference whether they severely limit their families or not.
It would of course make a real difference to Indians now living, for example, if
all Indian couples immediately limited their families to two or three children.
But even realizing this possibility requires a sophistication of perception and a
grasp of demographic and economic factors presently lacking among most people
in illiterate, under-educated, and agrarian societies.
The motivational factors underlying effective large-scale family planning in
industrial societies are not present in developing nations. A recent United Nations
report (1965) concluded that "high-fertility and low-fertility countries differ
greatly in every respect of economic and social advancement." Why is this?
Among other things, pre-industrial peoples, in the face of centuries of high mor-
tality, have been forced to develop a high-fertility institutional organization in
order to ensure their survival. Returning for a moment to the fertility variables
concerned with intercourse and conception, we must realize that preindustrial
family motivations are closely related to early marriage and a high marriage
rate, so little potential fertility is lost in that way.
Developing nations also exhibit high-fertility values for the conception vari-
able, as for example among the world's 500 million Moslems. The way in which
Islam is representative of pronatalist social forces generally should illustrate our
point. Sons are valued for their contribution to a continuity of family line and
land ownership, for agricultural labor, for strengthening kinship units in times
of strife, for support in old age, and for specifically religious reasons (Kirk, 1966).
In addition, the extended family in Islam acts as a buffer to direct consequences
of childbearing on the parents. Islam, often described as a religion of practice
rather than doctrine, permeates social life as few of the other great world religions
do. Moslem marriage institutions, emphasis on sexuality, and subordination
of women constitute particular Islamic characteristics which favor high fertility.
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The importance of such factors as patrilineal and patrilocal family structures with
traditional male dominance must be appreciated to understand why Moslems,
geographically and historically long associated with Europe, have not adopted
family planning along European patterns. In view of this, it seems particularly
ironic that we continue to act as if the key to population control in developing
nations were in devising new means of birth control, and of their distribution, by
simply extrapolating the idea of birth control clinics and family planning informa-
tion from the Western experience to the needs of the underdeveloped nations.
Nonetheless, researchers in several areas of Asia and Latin America have
reported findings interpreted as quite encouraging (Kirk, 1967). In a Thai
experiment, for instance, 23 percent of the women who had formerly disapproved
of birth control changed their attitudes to approval, and those who actually
used birth control rose from one to 21 percent (Hawley, 1966). In examining
these results, one can emphasize either that fully 23 percent of the women changed
their minds or that only 23 percent did so. Of course, as Spengler (1966:110)
points out: " . . . verbal attitudes respecting particular values may not be sig-
nificantly correlated with behavioral manifestations of those values." And we
know that there is often a distinction between "users" and "accepters," as for
example in Taiwan, where only (or fully!) 52 percent of the women in one study
still had the IUD in place after 18 months.
Because birth rates in the developing countries average 40 to 45 per 1,000 per
year, realistic and effective population control implies a drop of some 25 points,
or more than 50 percent, from the current level. At present fertility rates, this
means preventing approximately 50 million births a year, year after year. Perhaps
it is natural that most programs have tended to place great emphasis on the magic
of new contraceptive methods. But the fact remains that India, with 16,000
clinics last year and 100,000 sterilizations each year since 1963, has experienced
no appreciable decline in birth rates, except possibly in the largest cities. The
most successful programs have been among the most urban, most literate, most
advanced populations in Asia and Latin America. Family planning programs in
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Argentina, and Uraguay, for
example, have been among the most successful in the world. But we believe
the successes with family planning in these societies chiefly reflect the fact that
favorable motivations were already present.
It seems to us that the present emphasis on contraceptive methods and their
distribution in underdeveloped nations is at least partially unwarranted. While
the medical-biological components of population control are obviously indispen-
sible, the socio-cultural components always intervene between the availability
and use of birth control methods. Each major cultural area should be considered
in a context within which social and psychological factors modify and condition
degrees of acceptability and use of various contraceptive procedures. Any other
approach runs the serious risk of duplicating on a vast scale the Puerto Rican
experience, where the availability, acceptability, and knowledge of contraceptives
did not break through the cultural milieu to their widespread and effective use
(Hill, Stycos, et al, 1959).
No nation has yet effected significant declines in fertility through deliberate
family planning programs. In the Western nations, individual couples took
matters into their own hands and began to control the size of their families. It
should be noted that this process began before the widespread availability of
effective contraceptives. The same pattern has occured in Japan, where the
legalization and government supervision of abortion followed, rather than pre-
ceded, the recourse to abortion on the part of the Japanese population.
Just as we sometimes prefer to assume that Western patterns of economic and
political development will be the models for the underdeveloped nations, we often
tend to make the same assumption regarding demographic patterns. Under-
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developed nations probably will not follow our particular patterns of development
in either the economic or political spheres, and certainly not in the demographic
realm. Aside from the plethora of cultural and historical factors already intimated,
the argument could rest quite adequately on the proposition that the developing
nations do not have the time to follow in our footsteps.
CONCLUSION
What the above means in terms of population control is that ways must be
found of inducing motivation for small families into the thinking of millions of
human beings. We, in our Western sophistication, know what family planning
can mean for capital accumulation, dependency ratios, literacy rates, labor force
composition, and other variables related to economic welfare. But family planning,
in the developed nations, came from individual responses to changed economic
and social conditions. These changes preceded widespread birth control practices
in the West, while in the developing world the sequence must be just the opposite.
Pakistanis and Indians, Indonesians and Egyptians, do not share with the
Western nations a context of prior motivational patterns for family limitation.
If the means of fertility control alone were made more accessible to these people,
the average family size might decline somewhat. This is not in dispute. But in
reference to most underdeveloped nations, there is a gap between births and deaths
which is ever widening, and therefore a need to reduce drastically the level of
fertility. To reduce fertility levels, we need to know much more about the social
and psychological variables which operate to maintain high levels of fertility.
Only then can these forces be manipulated, quite frankly, toward massive change
of attitudes and behavior favorable to effective family planning. It seems likely
that policies of population control must include feedbacks involving direct rewards,
material and psychological, for fertility control, and penalties for those who do
not control their fertility (Spengler, 1966). At just what point varying magnitudes
of feedback will become motivatonally relevant is unknown, but it will surely be
different from culture to culture. In the underdeveloped nations, population
control will, of necessity, involve state intervention. But government intervention
should be based on the soundest possible understanding of the sociological features
peculiar to each major culture area, rather than merely on clinics equipped with the
latest and most modern contraceptive information and supplies.
The approach we advocate requires research which is expensive, difficult, and
time consuming. Even so, this approach might serve better, in the long run,
than the emphasis on clinics, to reverse the present rapid population growth in
the developing nations. Yet it often appears easier to think in terms of systems
of clinics, of quantities and qualities of contraceptive supplies, and of training
people to use specific methods of family limitation. All this seems especially
attractive because it is precisely the kind of family planning program in which
we are now engaged in the United States. Whether what might work for the
United States will also work in the developing nations, where the need is so much
greater, seems to us highly doubtful.
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